



# Executive Summary of the Report on Monitoring 2013 Elections



## Summary of the Report

### Introduction

The Government of Jordan vowed to holding parliamentary election meeting international standards of integrity, transparency, equity and freedom, in response to increasing to pressure it endured from regional and local political developments, exemplified by the Arab Spring and the growing calls in the street for political and economic reform and fighting corruption. Various political actors in the country have called for a new legislative framework for parliamentary elections that institutes the highest levels of integrity, transparency, equity and freedom.

With reference, it can be said the framework to have witnessed some improvements. The creation of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) for administering the parliamentary elections, as a requirement of the most recent constitutional amendments, and the introduction of the national district based on proportional lists are two of such improvements. However, a long way is still ahead. The national district

was assigned only (27) seats of the (150) parliamentary seats, limiting the participation of political parties in the process, thus missing the aim for which it was created. Moreover, the districting of local districts remain an impediment to the development of political life in the country, and resembles inequitable representation of the people.

The framework saw additional enhancements at the procedural level as well, especially with regards to voting and counting. This was demonstrated in the executive regulations issued by the IEC, which presented assurances not included in the Elections Law, such as designating the polling center on the electoral cards of voters, and placing pictures of candidates and symbols of lists on the ballots to overcome the issues of illiterate voting. Yet, unfortunately, these were not enough to eliminate the phenomena of political money and vote buying that were still encouraged by the districting as well as the weakness in law enforcement. These have affected the integrity and freedom of the electoral process, creating



substantial incongruities of the process and its outcomes and breaching the principles of the rule of law.

RASED's teams have documented several cases of prevailing irregularities in the results in some electoral districts. Observers noted different results from those announced by the IEC in dozens of polling stations, in addition to statistically inconsistent results such as more votes counted than there is registered voters «e.g. polling stations (12) and (13) in Karak's sixth district» or than there is voters in the voting registry «e.g. as shown in the court's expert report regarding polling station (154) in the first district of Balqa».

The period following the Elections Day also revealed evidence of misconduct affecting the outcomes of the electoral process, as shown by the analysis carried out by RASED's teams and its parallel vote tabulation and the reviews conducted by the experts assigned by the courts. Some of the investigated incidents were considered pure human error, such as unintentional mistakes in data entry and summation.

On the other hand, some cases indicated elaborate attempts to rig the results of the elections to favor some candidates such as fake stamps, unauthenticated ballots and differences between counted votes and actual voter turnout, as was shown in the court's expert report on the (143) polling station in the fourth district in Amman. Further review by RASED's teams showed discrepancies between the numbers of ballots and numbers of actual turnouts in several polling stations including (24) and (44) in the first district. These finds have casted shadows on the announced results of the election.

Shortcomings are also noted with respect to accountability and the rule of law. As no results were announced on behalf of the numerous investigation committees created by the IEC throughout the course of the electoral process to look into multiple accounts of possible illegal actions recorded by RASED and the courts, including an intended investigation into the accounts of forgery in the sixth district of Karak.

Even though the new legislative framework for the parliamentary



elections for the first time acknowledged the right of local civil society organizations and international mission to monitor the progress of the electoral process, practices of the electoral administration did not fully comply with the principles of transparency. The delay in announcing the final voters' lists by the IEC, and publishing the final results of the election in password protected (PDF) documents not allowing observers easy access to statistically analyze these results, are two examples of such actions.

Similarly, the counting and tabulation process have witnessed improvements at the legislative level with guarantees to ensure the proper conduct of the process, however, the implementation of this segment of the electoral process did not coincide with the spirit of the law. The IEC failed to announce the executive regulation for the counting and tabulation, causing ambiguity and chaos as to the proceedings, allowing for the most notable number of violations by citizens, candidates and their delegates, and the electoral committees. Unrest was also caused by the differences between

the results announced at some of the polling stations and those announced by the IEC.

Finally, the experts' reports order by different courts around the country have indicated a mismatch, among a small percentage of ballots, between the picture of candidates and their photos. This finding presents a great challenge to RASED as it is unable to predict an explanation for such a mistake, given the improbability of displacement by the printing house in a way for the names and photos to be shuffled. Noting that no comment was issued on this issue by the IEC, nor anyone has been held accountable for it.

## 1. The integrity of the electoral process

### \* Procedural guarantees

The legislative framework of the electoral process, resembled by the elections law, the law of the IEC and the executive regulations issued by the latter, presented a series of procedural guarantees to safeguard the integrity of the process. These safeguards were mainly adopted in the executive regulations issued by the IEC following recommendations by RASED, as the elections law fell short of mentioning them. Examples of these are the assignment of the polling station on the voters' electoral cards and the voters' lists to avoid multiple voting by the same voter, and placing the picture of the candidates and symbols of the national lists next to their names to avoid illiterate voting.

Several indicators have shown a lack of accountability on the account of breaches by some of those involved in the administration of the electoral process, especially in the stages of voters' registration and preparations of the final voters' lists, despite the attempt of the

IEC to provide further assurances in its executive regulations for the integrity of the electoral process. Therefore, the desired level of integrity was not met.

### \* Reliability of the voters' lists

The preliminary voters' lists were found to have a higher level of accuracy in comparison to the cumulative voters' lists that were aggregated between 1989 and 2010, and used for the purpose of the 2010 parliamentary elections, based on an audit of the lists carried out by RASED. However, the new lists contained a significant amount of information on voters that did not match voters' real information. It also carried names of military personnel, in breach of the elections law, which was initially refuted by the IEC, to announce at a later stage that it had written off about (5,000) military personnel of the voters' lists.

The integrity of the voters' lists came under question also due to the delay in announcing the final lists by the IEC, as they were announced (70) days after the closure of the voters' registration process on October 15, 2012.

### \* Integrity of voting and voters' flow

Though the Civil Coalition acknowledges the evolution brought by the IEC to the legislative framework of the electoral process, it has to refer to the lenience of some of the voting and counting committees in abiding to the executive procedures issued by the IEC. This was noted by its observers, who covered most of the polling stations in the 45 electoral districts. This leniency raises questions on the integrity of the voting and counting processes, as voting was interrupted for prayers and eating, with no attention given to the ballot boxes during the cessation of voting. RASED's teams observed (76) morning incident and (395) afternoon incident of voting interruption, totaling at (471) polling stations left unattended on Election Day. In addition to other incidents of assault on polling centers and tampering with ballot boxes.

These observations were confirmed through the experts' reports presented to the courts looking into contests to the results of the elections, as ballots carrying fake

stamps were found inside ballot boxes in some districts that were counted as correct. Moreover, they were confirmed by RASED's review of the relevant numbers announced by the IEC, as the total number of votes received by candidates in some polling centers exceeded the number of voters registered in the respective centers. Clearly indicating manipulation of the results.

In addition, courts' experts' reports pointed the existence of ballots showing pictures of candidates that do not match the names next to them, affirming what was noted by RASED's observers of mistakes in some of the official ballots printed by the IEC. Even though the frequency of such incidents being reported was low, the Civil Coalition stands perplexed as to the causes of such incidents, especially as the IEC failed to announce the number of such ballots that were canceled, and where no one was held accountable for this mistake.



### \* Integrity of vote counting and sorting

The legal framework governing the process of counting and sorting votes have witnessed significant improvements meeting international standards of integrity and transparency, as counting committees were instructed to hang the results of the counting on the entrances of the respective polling station. The improvements also granted candidates or their delegates, local and international observers and media correspondents the right to monitor the counting process until the results are issued by the voting and counting committee, while allowing them to file objections and immediate resolution of these complaints. Notwithstanding, a comparative review of the results announced by the voting and counting committees and those announced by the IEC, carried out by RASED's, showed discrepancy in the results of (37) polling stations «e.g. polling stations (30) in Aqaba, 24 in the second district of Ajloun, and 127 in the first district of Zarqa».

Such observations were confirmed

by the experts' reports submitted to the courts, as they found hundreds of ballots carrying fake stamps and inconsistencies in the signatures of some the heads of the voting and counting committees on the minutes of Election Day. The experts' reports noted that all (300) ballots found in the boxes of polling station (143) in the fourth district of Amman were found to carry fake stamps. Moreover, the voting and counting committee of the same station noted in its closing minutes that it had received only (700) ballot, while the opening minutes show it received 833 ballots. The latter number also raises a question on the truthiness of the figure, as ballots come in stacks of (50).

Concurrently, the experts' reports noted discrepancies between the numbers indicated in the closing minutes and those indicated by the handwritten registry. The experts' report on polling station 3 of Balqa's first district showed there are actually (262) unused ballots, in contrast the closing minutes stating only (250) unused ballots. The reports also pointed that the voters' registries, electoral cards and minutes marked with the polling station (152) of the same



district actually belong to station (154). Other examples include (11) unauthenticated ballots in the boxes of polling station (143) of the fourth district in Amman, and a discrepancy between the total number of votes indicated in the closing minutes and the actual number of ballots in the box. These were 277 and 239, respectively.

RASED's reports of malpractice and rigging of results in the sixth district of Karak were confirmed by the experts' reports based on which the judiciary annulled the election results of the district. Discrepancies between the actually results, based on the ballots in the boxes, and those indicated in the counting minutes were found, in addition to finding different signatures for the head of the voting and counting committee of polling station 1 on the various minutes of the Election Day. Fake electoral cards, names of voters in the registry with no matching electoral cards and unauthenticated ballots were found in the boxes of stations 1, 2, 7 and 9. RASED had noted these violations in a statement preceding the experts' report by 3 weeks, and received a letter from the IEC in which it commits to investigating

the forgery. However, to the date of writing this report, there has been no indication of such investigation or any report issued by the IEC to this regard.

**\* Reliability of tabulation and announcing the preliminary and final results**

Many questions have been raised with reference to the ambiguity of the legislative framework governing the tabulation and announcement of results, as the IEC did not prepare executive regulations to elaborate the process of vote tabulation, data entry of the results and announcing the preliminary results, and sufficed with verbal instructions to the electoral committees.

In this regard, RASED's teams have noted several incidents contesting the integrity of the tabulation process. For one, an audit of the preliminary results issued by the IEC showed discrepancies from those announced by the voting and counting committees. The IEC later admit to mistakes in the data entry by its staff of the results. In addition to misplacing several



closing minutes for varying but short periods of time causing delays in announcing the preliminary results in some districts. Moreover, significant delays were observed by RASED's team in reporting the tabulation results to the special electoral committee at the IEC as was the case in the first district of Irbid. Even more, the special electoral committee of the IEC was not able to announce preliminary results for Balqa's first district due to incomplete tabulation as a ballot box was no were to be found.

The situation regarding the national district was in an even worse shape, as the final results took three days to be announced. Several contests of the national district results were filed, as RASED pointed discrepancies in the votes assigned to at least 20 of the national lists, following a comparison of RASED's parallel vote tabulation outcomes with the results announced by the IEC. The findings of RASED were confirmed by the experts' reports, requested by the courts, however, the discrepancies did not affect the seats allocations, as concluded in case number 77/2013 that was filed by the Democratic Advancement List.

## 2. The transparency of the electoral process

### \* Access to information

RASED acknowledges the developments brought by the IEC in easing citizens and interest groups' access to the information pertaining to the electoral process. The IEC published all relevant information, including the legislative framework, the preliminary and final voters' lists, and the locations of the polling centers, on website it had created for this purpose. However, all of the information was shared in password protected PDF files not allowing for copy or conversion of the data for purposes of review, audit and analysis. In addition, the IEC failed to publish the executive regulation for the counting and announcing the results.

Notably, the Civil Coalition filed several requests with the IEC in order to receive the final results of the elections in Excel formats, in order for its teams to carry further audits and statistical review, with no positive response from the IEC, to the date of writing this report.

Access to information was also impeded by the IEC with relation to the outcome of its investigations in the electoral violations documented by RASED. The Coalition had provided the IEC with reports on multiple violations by voters, candidates and IEC staff, however, no concrete actions have been taken by the IEC with this regard, posing questions on the transparency of the accountability within the electoral administrator.

**\* Administrative and financial transparency of the electoral authority**

The IEC repeatedly refused to announce the procedures and criteria for the recruitment of its staff, as well the mechanisms of ensuring equal opportunity, if any. Moreover, the IEC failed to make public its budget, sources of funding and means of expenditure, falling short from meeting international standards for the transparency of electoral administrators.

**\* Disclosure of electoral campaign financing**

The executive regulations issued by the IEC allowed it the right to request detailed financial disclosure from the candidates, but the regulation failed to make such disclosure compulsory and did not impose any penalties on. Thus, dozens of candidates and lists did not meet such request by the IEC. Moreover, the Commission only announced the names of those candidates who did not comply with the request, and did not make public the disclosures of those who did not, by which limiting voters ability to access information on the amounts spent on electoral campaigns and their sources of funding.

### 3. The equity of the electoral process

#### \* Weight of representation

The seats' distribution table annexed to the Parliamentary Elections Law (25) of 2012 represents an infringement to international standards on the weight of representation of an elected seat to a national assembly, such as the geographic distance from the capital, population density, level of services and development requirements. An example of the unfairness of the electoral system in Jordan is illustrated by the unequal weight of representation with concern to population density of the electoral district. Where the ratio of seats allocated for the sixth and seventh districts in Irbid and the fourth district in Amman to the total number of seats allocated for local districts equals about half the ratio of registered voters in each of the districts to the total number of voters registered at the national level. On the other hand, the ratio of seats allocated for the first districts in each of Ma'an and Balqa to the total number of seats allocated for local districts is equal to almost twice the ration of registered voters

in each of the districts to the total number of voters at the national level, as shown in figure 1.

Inequity is also witnessed with regards to the representation of religious and ethnic minorities in parliament, as the electoral legislative framework defined the ethnical and/or religious background for each of the parliamentary seats. By which it enforces a cap on the number of seats won by Christians, Circassians and Chechens at the local districts level, as members of these ethnicities are prohibited from running for elections in local districts that do not have a seat for their respective minority. Exposing a violation of the Jordanian constitution, which states all citizens to be equal regardless of their race or religion.

#### \* Access to media

The results of media monitoring done by RASED's teams between December 20, 2012 and January 23, 2013, as well as semi-regular monitoring following the start of voters' registration, have shown the authorities inability to enforce the legislative framework governing electoral campaigns. Even though




Figure (1): A comparison between the ratio of parliamentary seats allocated to each district to the total seats allocated to local districts, and the ratio of registered voters in each district to the total number of registered voters at the national level

Note: Numbers of registered voters were used as a large percentage of Jordanians reside and vote in different districts

the executive regulations clearly stated official media outlets to remain unbiased towards all candidates and national lists, records have been made of allowing more airtime for some candidates through talk shows and debates, permitting some candidates and national lists to start their campaigns before the date set in the law, and differentiating between national lists with regards to the timing of advertisements. Moreover, the legislative framework failed to set similar rules concerning private media outlets. Most alarmingly, the IEC made no reaction to such violations, failing to hold those involved accountable.

#### \* Electoral campaigns spending

The Jordanian Elections Law did not set a higher limit of allowed spending on electoral campaigns, and the IEC neglected to do in its executive regulations, missing on the possibility of achieving higher equity of the electoral process, considering the varying level of personal wealth of the candidates. Moreover, by overlooking this aspect of regulations, the legislative

framework allowed new ways for candidates to use political money to influence the will of the voters, through vote buying. This was resembled, for example, in the false employment contracts some candidates signed with voters as members of their electoral campaign teams, while the actual intent was to secure their votes through transfer of money.

#### \* Neutrality of the electoral administration

The IEC exercised its constitutional and legal responsibilities while largely standing at equal distance from all candidates and lists, as well as from all local and international entities monitoring the elections. However, violations of this neutrality was recorded on behalf of some of the public servants working under the IEC, especially during voters' registration, as some of the registration centers' staff were lenient in abiding by the executive regulations issued by the IEC.

Moreover, RASED recoded limited cases of support shown by official institutions and prominent officials in favor of certain

candidates against others, where some government vehicles were used in electoral campaigning, and some officials attended rallies of certain candidates and not others. In addition, the inconsistency of the IEC in addressing electoral campaigns' violations had also weakened the ability of the IEC and other government entities to enforce the law.

#### \* The right to appeal and litigation

Of the most prominent developments to the legislative framework governing the electoral process is transferring the jurisdiction of deciding on contests to the outcomes of the elections from parliament itself to the judiciary. This came as a requirement of the constitutional reforms implemented in 2011, to end years of conflict of interest, where parliament would decide on legal cases to which its members are parties. The transformation allowed for precedents to take place, as the courts annulled the results of the election in the sixth district of Karak, based on obvious manipulation and rigging of the results.

Nonetheless, the current legislative framework did not allow adequate jurisdiction for the judiciary to follow thoroughly on electoral crimes, hold the perpetrators accountable and correct the effects of wrong doings, as it can only do so if an appeal is filed. Moreover, courts were given a choice between two verdicts, if it found concluded the announced results to be wrong, of either annulling the electoral process in the district in question, or announcing a different candidate as the winner. This has limited the effectiveness of the judiciary in pursuing cases and its ability to enforce electoral equity.

The right of appeals and litigations has been granted during other stages of the electoral process, including voters' and candidates' registrations, as well as referring perpetrators of electoral criminal acts directly to the prosecutor general by the voting and counting committees.

RASED had monitored the proceedings of the appeals filed by citizens contesting the validity of the membership of some members of parliament, and concluded they were unbiased and objective,



and that all relevant information was made public, including the preparation of the experts' reports requested by the courts. Therefore, it can be said the legal proceedings to have highly met international standards for equity and transparency.

**\* Accountability and the rule of law**

The elections law identified varying penalties with relation to electoral crimes, though it did not explicitly indicate the authority primarily responsible for legally pursuing the prosecution of these crimes and hold the perpetrators accountable. Noting that the IEC showed weakness in enforcing accountability throughout the different stages of the electoral process, as it took no action to persecute perpetrators of electoral crimes during the voters' registration period, although documented violations were presented to the IEC involving public servants under its jurisdiction at the time. Several investigation committees were created but with no output to the date of writing this report.

Lack of response by the electoral authorities to the obvious cases of vote buying and political money, as well as it refraining from removing campaign materials violating the legislative framework, which were documented by RASED's teams, are also indicators of the IEC's inability to enforce the law.

Moreover, the IEC had reported that no one was referred to the prosecutor general for electoral crimes on Election Day is an indicator of extreme leniency by the electoral administrator in enforcing the law, as numerous cases of violations were reported and documented by RASED's teams. Which also contradicts the outcomes of the courts' proceedings that indicated several violations to have had happened, leading to courts' ruling of annulling the results in certain polling stations, such as 143 in the fourth district of Amman, or the results of an entire district, such as the sixth district in Karak. On the latter point, it is also noteworthy to highlight the fact that the court proceedings and rulings did not instigate investigations into the people responsible for manipulating

the elections and holding them accountable.

In addition, RASED's observers noted changes to the members of voting and counting committees in several locations across the country, where the IEC did not justify such an action.

All in all, it can be concluded, that the legislative framework governing the electoral process and the administration of the electoral process had largely failed to meet minimum international standards of accountability and the rule of law.

## 4. The freedom of the electoral process

### \* Procedural guarantees and the free will of voters

Actions affecting the free will of the voters have been criminalized in the elections law, penalties were set at either imprisonment for a period no less than six months and no more than two year or a fine of no less than 500 JD and no more than 1000 JD, or both. However, the ambiguity of the law regarding the entity responsible for enforcing the law caused the wide spread of electoral crimes, from the start of voters registration until Election Day, such as the use of political money, vote buying and illegally holding electoral cards of voters in most, if not all, of the electoral districts. Violations even took a form of intimidating voters on Election Day and inside the polling stations, most evidently in the second district of Amman.

Moreover, in conformity with international studies investigating the relationships between the type of the electoral system and the use of political money, the Jordanian electoral system was found to



do so. The studies indicate that systems permitting high personal interaction between candidates and voters allow opportunities for the use of political money to affect the will of voters. And whereas the Jordanians electoral system, being a singular nontransferable vote (one-man, one-vote) system, institutes the personalization of the candidate-voter relation, it aided in escalating vote buying, especially during campaign periods.

The Civil Coalition observed the limited number of incidents involving electoral crimes that were referred to the courts, on the account of vote buying and illegally holding electoral cards. No sentencing was announced to the date of writing this report, and most of the defendants were allowed bail. Some even won seats and are currently members of parliament.

At a different level, the Jordanian constitution also contributed to lowering the level of coherence of the legislative framework of the elections with international standards of equity and freedom. It had limited the right to run for parliamentary elections to those

who have completed 30 years of age, prohibiting about 70% of the country's population from fully exercising their citizenship, where the ideal situation would be to allow all of those allowed to exercise the right to vote to exercise the right to run as candidates.

Furthermore, the freedom and equity of the electoral process was impacted by the limitations imposed by the IEC and the electoral system on individuals of minorities to run for the elections. The electoral districting in the legislative framework tried to secure minimum representation of minorities such as the Christians, Circassians, Chechens and Bedouins by assigning parliamentary seats for each of the groups to run for. However, this turned into an upper ceiling of their representation to the legislator, as they were not allowed to run for other seats outside their allocations.

#### \* Independence of the electoral administration

In this regard, the mere creation of the IEC is considered a significant

development towards better realization of the independence of the electoral administrator, where for the first time the Government of Jordan and its Ministry of Interior are no longer responsible for managing the electoral process, based on the most recent constitutional developments of 2011.

Notwithstanding, the IEC should be further detached from government's institutions and authority, especially with regards to budgeting and administration. Though the IEC has full autonomy, its budget remains under the control of the government and is submitted to parliament as part of the government's state budget, which could to leverage and influence exercised by the government over the decisions of the IEC. Similarly, the administrative regulations, being human resources, procurement and financial management, are all set by the government, limiting the IEC's ability to recruit the qualified staff it requires and to suffice with existing government employees.

In relation, the independence of the IEC was also impacted as

many of its staff were seconded from the Ministry of Interior, who continued to having their linkages with their supervisors in the Ministry of Interior. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior had interfered in the proceedings of the electoral process, especially during the period of voters' registration as it had instructed the Civil Status and Passports Department, which falls under its mandate, to allow for the change of electoral districts of voters according to criteria different from that required by the executive regulations of the IEC.

#### \* Confidentiality of the voting

The elections law criminalized public voting, and the executive regulations of the IEC attempted to limit vote tracing and trends before the counting of votes begins, in order to maintain the secrecy of the voting process. Placing the photos of candidates and symbols of national lists next their names on the ballot, was of the most significant procedures to do so. However, the legislative framework failed to address actions to be taken by the voting and counting committees when votes are made

public, by either calling it out loud or showing the marked ballot to the public before casting it in the box. RASED had reported numerous incidents where voters made their votes public, in relation to political money and vote buying, where the voting and counting committees had allowed them to cast their votes in the boxes.

The secrecy of voting was also affected by the design and location of the voting booths, which allowed, in some polling stations, those present to see who the voters were voting for. In addition, some polling stations witnessed group voting, where voters were able to see each other's votes, also in breach of the principle of secrecy.



Break the Secrecy of Voting in one Voting Stations during Election Day - January 23, 2013



## Executive Summary



Cutting of a Voter's Electoral Card after they casted their vote  
January 23, 2013



## Executive Summary of the Report

Early election for the Seventeenth Parliament of Jordan was held on January 23, 2013, as a result of King Abdullah II's decision to dismiss the sixteenth parliament before the end of its term. The election was originally to be held during October 2012; however, it was delayed for logistical reasons. For the first time in the kingdom's history, an independent body, rather than the Ministry of Interior, administered the election. The Independent Electoral Commission was created as a requirement of the most recent amendments to the constitution, passed by parliament late September 2011.

The Civil Coalition for Monitoring the 2013 Parliamentary Election «RASED» observed the proceedings of the process from the start of voters' registration on August 7, 2012, to the time of court decisions on contests to the results of the election. A team composed of about 4,000 observers took part in the effort, 3,150 of them on Election Day itself. The observers were provided with training throughout the period of election to build their capacity in elections

monitoring, based on a set of forms and indicators carefully designed to measure the coherence of the Jordanian electoral process with international best practices and standards of integrity, transparency, freedom and equity of electoral processes.

### First: Monitoring of voters' registration, preparation of preliminary voters' lists and contesting them

Efforts for monitoring voters' registration and the preparation of preliminary voters' lists took place during the period from August 7, 2012 until October 15, 2012, through a team of 400 local observers. The observers used five different forms during their visits to the registration centers, to interview voters before and after the registration and registration staff on the proceedings of the registration. They also documented complaints by citizens to the process, which were also collected through the hotline designated by the Coalition during the



registration period for citizens' complaints.

Analysis of the information collected showed several mishaps in the registration process, such as forcing citizens to sign on receipts of their electoral cards before they actually received them, discrepancies in implementing the registration procedures and in requesting documents between the different registration centers, some cases of military personnel registration, illegal group registration, and illegal changes to the electoral districts. In addition to handing electoral cards to unauthorized persons by the law, illegally holding electoral cards, presence of prospect candidates in the offices of registration staff and pressures exerted to facilitate illegal cases of registration. All of this had led to make possible incidents of vote buying and use of political money. The IEC was also faced technical and logistical issues resulting from a lack of preparedness to meet the demand on registration. The insufficient number of registration centers and their poor geographic distribution, insufficient human resources and lack of their capacity, and flaws in

the electronic registration systems and faults in the printers used are few of the reasons that caused crowdedness of the registration centers.

Interference of the Ministry of Interior in the registration process was also document, as the Ministry issued regulations for changing electoral districts contradicting those issued by the IEC. Public servants pressured by their employing government entities to register for the elections is also considered a breach of voters' freewill.

RASED's teams also monitored the publication of the preliminary voters' lists and contests filed against them for a week starting on October 31, 2012 in 192 centers. This segment of the registration process witnessed the least number of violations and mistakes thus can be considered the soundest of the electoral process stages. Notwithstanding, suspicion caused by the IEC delaying publishing the final voters' lists to December 24, 2012.

## Second: Auditing the preliminary voters' lists

RASED carried out efforts between November 1 and 4 to audit the accuracy of the preliminary lists of 2,277,077 registered voters issued by the IEC on October 31, 2012, through a team of 102 observers. Two methodologies were used; “voter-to-lists”, where a representative sample of citizens were surveyed to investigate their registration and accuracy of their information in the voters' lists and on the electoral cards, and “lists-to-voters”, where a representative sample of those registered according to the preliminary lists were interviewed to cross-reference their information with those indicated in the lists.

The results of the audit were issued on November 5, pointing that 0.4% of the registered voters' electoral cards were held by other people, while about 16.4% of those registered have not yet received their electoral cards from the registration centers. It also showed a mismatch between the name in the voters' lists and on the respective electoral card for between 4,500 and 6,800 registered voters.

While checking the accuracy of electoral districts, RASED found that 2.7% of the registered voters had changed their electoral districts. 40.5% of whom used the birth place of their fathers or grandfathers, whereas 59.5% used their current place of residence to do so. The results also showed that about 1.1% had their electoral district changed illegally, as they neither lived nor had ancestry in their registered districts.

## Third: Monitoring candidates and national lists registration

The IEC designated 45 centers, one in each of the local districts, for the registration of candidates for local districts, and five committees in its offices in Amman for the registration of national lists. The process took place from the morning of December 22 to the evening of December 24, 2012.

Figures issued by the IEC indicated 830 citizens wishing to run for the election on the national lists, 86 of which were women. Sixty-one national lists were registered, 13 on a part basis, while the remaining were groupings of political, social

and tribal figures. On the other hand, there were 699 citizens, 129 of which were women, wanting to run for the election in the local districts. This shows a significantly higher ratio of candidates per seat in the national district in comparison to that of the local districts, as 830 candidates were running against 27 seats, while 699 were running against 123 seats, respectively.

RASED had deployed observers to all of the registration centers, including the five committees for the registration of national lists, to monitor the process over the three days. Information were collected based on three forms to gauge the opinions of candidates before and after the registration, and document the notes of the observers on the process.

The collected information showed a high level of dissatisfaction of the process by candidates, especially concerning the order of listing on the candidates' lists and on the ballots. The IEC was inconsistent in the use of lottery and time based ordering for candidates and national lists. In addition, it did not strictly abide to the timeframe of the registration as stipulated

in its executive regulations, not to the required documents for registration. Moreover, the lack of networking between the different computers used by the five committees in charge of registering national lists caused confusion due to the duplication of the symbols of different lists. The delay in issuing final voters' lists until after the start of candidates' registration also had its impact on the registration process, where a pre-requirement for candidates' registration is for the citizens to be registered as a voter. The results also showed that 22% of those wishing to register as candidates expressed their discontent by the behavior of the registration staff, while 10% said they felt favoritism to some candidates against others. Conformingly, RASED documented attempts to pressure citizens not to register, and other incident of security apparatus interference to facilitate other candidates' registration.

#### Fourth: Monitoring electoral campaigns of individual candidates and national lists

Through its team of local observers, RASED monitored the electoral campaigns in different governorates of Jordan. Using three forms to document their observations, interviews with candidates and reports of campaign violations and incidents. In addition to three hotlines designated to receive complaints by citizens on electoral violations and crimes. The electoral campaigns for candidates and lists were to take place between December 22, 2012 and the end of January 22, 2013 according to the legislative framework of the electoral process, however, RASED covered a period longer on both sides of the period to ensure campaigns abiding to the regulations.

The legislative framework of the electoral process had failed to address an upper limit to spending on electoral campaigns, which allowed for vote buying and the use of political money. Moreover, the phenomena of illegally holding electoral cards by candidates and their representatives was

largely observed throughout the electoral process. In addition to most candidates failing to abide to the timeframe stipulated in the regulations for the media campaigns, as activities were held before candidates' registration had started and continued on Election Day.

The observation efforts indicated violations by many candidates with regards to the display of campaign materials, as such materials were hung on the fences of schools, hospitals and other government institutions. In addition to placing them in location impairing the site of drivers and affecting traffic flow. The equity of media access was also under question, as some official media outlets allowed bigger space for some candidates through inviting them to talk shows, though they are required by the law to stand at equal distance from all candidates.

Furthermore, the regulations issued by the IEC had requested candidates and national lists to submit declarations of their campaign financing, however, the majority of them failed to do so, with no penalty imposed on them.

On a different note, five candidates and one head of a national list were referred to the Prosecutor General for electoral crimes consisting of vote buying and the use of political money, all of whom were released on bail, and some went on to winning seats in parliament and acquiring parliamentary immunity, thus halting the judicial proceedings.

### **Fifth: Monitoring the proceedings of voting and counting**

The voting process started at 07:00 on January 23, 2013 and ended at 20:00 of the same day, after a one-hour extension was announced across all electoral districts by the IEC, in accordance with its prerogatives in the elections law. The voting and counting took place in 4,069 polling stations in 1,484 polling centers, distributed among 45 electoral districts.

RASED had deployed 2,500 fixed local observers at the polling stations and 250 roaming observers to monitor the proceedings of voting and counting across the country and follow up on incidents

and electoral crimes, reported to its Operations Room. The observers were trained on five forms used to collect information for each of the stages of election Day, and were provided with a manual explaining the methodologies of the forms and the techniques of reporting to the Operations Room using the SMS system put in place by RASED's technical team. The Coalition also held three press conferences on Election Day to report on its preliminary observations.

The collected information indicated that 11.3% of the polling stations were late in opening for voters, 91.4% of the observers reported the existence of electoral campaign materials on the outside and inside the polling centers, and 2.7% pointed the voting and counting committees did not cross-reference the information on the electoral cards with the information in the voters' lists.

Moreover, RASED documented several incidents of disconnection of the electronic registration system, and halt of the voting process and leaving ballot boxes unattended for lunch or prayer breaks. In addition to some committees not requiring



voters to dip their fingers in the ink after they had casted their ballots. The Coalition also noted cases of replacing members of the voting and counting committees without explanation provided to the observers or representatives of candidates, and some members of the voting and counting committees caused confusion by refusing to wear their credentials, which can also be considered a breach of the accountability, transparency and rule of law principles.

At a different level, several notes have been documented with regards to the secrecy of the votes, as 1.8% of RASED's observers reported the presence of more than one person at the voting booth. The Coalition had also made remarks on the design and location of the voting booths at the polling stations, which do not allow for the maximum level of vote secrecy.

Few incidents of attacks on polling stations were also reported, as unidentified individuals removed ballot boxes from the station and play with their contents.

The observers reported the presence of security apparatus

personnel, in military uniforms and civil clothing, inside some of the polling center, which constitutes a violation of the law. In addition to 1,524 cases of violations of the electoral process on Election Day (as shown in figure 2), including vote buying in the premises of voting centers with no reaction by the police to put an end to the crimes and hold the perpetrators accountable.

The vote counting process commenced almost immediately after the end of the voting period at 20:00 in most of the polling stations. The Coalition's observers noted several remarks on the proceedings of the counting, most significantly the voting and counting committees not checking the authenticity of the voting ballots in the boxes with concern to the stamp and signatures. In addition to the obvious lack of capacity of the committees in filling the results forms, as they did not note the reasons for annulling the ballots and did not write the numbers of the results in letters, which caused issued with the tabulation of the results.

The tabulation process of the results

was not better, as results were delayed from being communicated to the special committee at the IEC for no obvious reasons, as was the case in Irbid's first district. The delays were also caused by losing some ballot boxes, as was the case in Balqa's first district.

In addition, at the national district level, the final results of the tabulation were announced two days after the process had ended, due to the repeated recounting and tabulation of the ballots based on several contests by some national lists. Each of the recounting cases announced results different from the others, resulting in questioning the accuracy of the process and it meeting the voters' well.

### **Sixth: Parallel vote tabulation for national lists**

The Civil Coalition carried out a parallel vote tabulation (PVT), for the first time in Jordan and the Arab region. PVT is a process based on tabulating the results of a representative sample of the polling stations through local observers attending the counting process in order to project the overall results

of the elections. RASED collected and projected the results for 10 of the lists running in the national district in parallel to the tabulation done by the IEC.

The PVT process aims at verifying the final results announced by the electoral administrator and test the accuracy of result communication from the polling stations to the central administrator. It also enhances the role of civil society in monitoring the electoral process.

The comparison between the results of the PVT conducted by RASED and the final results announced by the IEC indicated an acceptable error margin of 1.5%, indicating the accuracy of the model developed by the Coalition's technical team. It should be noted that the results of PVT were announced on the morning of the following day to the Election Day, 12 hours before the IEC announced the results of the national district.



### Seventh: Audit of the results announced by the IEC

RASED commenced with auditing the results announced by the IEC immediately after the conclusion of the electoral process, by comparing these results with the figures obtained by the observers stationed in the polling stations. The analysis showed discrepancies in the results of 20 national lists and 37 polling stations, and improbable results in three stations as the turnout was higher than the number of registered voters in these stations. Moreover, some ballot boxes contained a lesser number of ballots of the turnout in the respective station according to the results forms.

The statistical analysis also pointed that only three national lists (Al-Wasat Al-Islmi, Urdon Aqwa, and Sawt Al-Watan) of the 22 lists to win seats had consistent results across all 45 electoral districts. In addition, it indicated that 8.8% of the national district ballots were annulled, while 3.4% of the votes casted in the local districts were annulled.

### Eighth: Monitoring court cases contesting the results of the election

Contests to the results of the election were filed and ruled within 15 days from announcing the final results by the IEC, according to the legal timeframe stipulated in the law. Noting the new constitution, in article 71, has given jurisdiction in this matter to the courts of appeal, as opposed to parliament itself.

RASED's legal team followed up on the proceedings of the 31 litigations, mainly filed by unsuccessful candidates. Twenty-two of the cases were filed with the Amman Court of Appeals that holds the jurisdiction over Amman, Balqa, Zarqa, Madaba and Karak in this matter, seven in the Irbid Court of Appeals holding jurisdiction over Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun and Mafraq, and two in the Ma'an Court of Appeals with jurisdiction over Ma'an, Tafleh and Aqaba.

The presiding judges formed several experts committees to audit the results of the election, where the reports of these committees

indicated several violations of the electoral process, most significant of which forgery of the IEC's stamps, manipulation with the contents of some ballot boxes, and incorrect data entry of the results of some polling stations for the tabulation process.


The courts dismissed most of the cases, and maintained the memberships of parliamentarians, except for the sixth district in Karak, where the ruling was to annul the entire results of the election for obvious and wide

spread acts of forgery. Constituting a legal precedent, forcing the IEC to conduct a reelection in that district.

Notwithstanding, it is worth noting, the judiciary's limited jurisdiction to contested cases only, and being restricted to either annul the membership of a member of parliament or annul the entire results of a district, with no power to further investigate the violations and crimes committed and holding the perpetrators accountable for their unlawful actions.



Election Day Operations Room, SMS Processing Team -  
January 23, 2013



Distribution of incidents documented by RASED's observers on Election Day, totaling at (1,524)